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RICARDO, DAVID (1772-1823) 
 
David Ricardo was born in London to an affluent Jewish 
Portuguese-Italian-Dutch family.  After private education he 
went into business as a stock-jobber. Later, he became a 
“hearer” of the Unitarian minister Thomas Belsham, 
published a few papers on monetary policy, which provided 
the occasion for meeting James Mill and Thomas Robert 
Malthus, wrote a book on economic theory, and was elected 
to Parliament.  He died suddenly at a rather young age at his 
estate at Gatcombe Park in Gloucestershire. 
Ricardo’s is a tricky case in the history of 
Utilitarianism, since in Mill’s dreams he should have been in 
charge of the School’s economic branch, and the dream 
turned into legend in histories of Utilitarianism by Stephen 
(1876) and Halévy (1901-4). As a reaction, later historians of 
economic analysis, such as Schumpeter (1954) and Hollander 
(1979), tried hard to detect in Ricardo  a purely ‘scientific’ 
contribution free from philosophical considerations. Sraffa, 
the editor of Ricardo’s Works, shared the same attitude, but at 
least pointed at Ricardo’s acquaintance with natural science 
as a possible source of methodological inspiration. 
A partial return to Halévy’s position was staged by 
Hutchinson (1978, pp. 26-57)  (followed by Depoortère, 
2008), even if with intentions opposite to Halévy.  
Hutchinson sought to prove that more than a Benthamite, 
Ricardo was the follower of James Mill’s methodology and 
the protagonist of a   “scientific revolution” yielding a more 
abstract “economic science” than that offered by Smithian 
“political economy”.  
One of Halévy’s myths is that Mill schooled 
Ricardo in Cartesian methodology by teaching him Dugald 
Stewart’s philosophy. Thanks to Sraffa we have abundant 
evidence now that Mill taught Ricardo party-politics and 
publishing policies but not “Method”.  Moreover, it is most 
unlikely  Mill  would have taught Ricardo both Stewart’s 
philosophy and Cartesianism, since Stewart was, no less than 
Hume and Adam Smith, an anti-Cartesian. As early as 1899, 
Patten suggested a more balanced picture,  while de Marchi 
has argued that it is “unlikely that James Mill tutored Ricardo 
in method” and contended that the relationship between Mill 
and Ricardo concerned political  matters not theory (1983, p. 
175), a conclusion reached also by Hollander. Further, it  is 
as well to keep in mind that what constituted Utilitarianism in 
Ricardo’s day was not entirely clear, and many were prepared 
to accept utilitarian legal philosophy who rejected its moral 
and psychological postulates, and held back from its 
democratic conclusions. The following may be a few 
plausible conclusions on Ricardo’s ‘philosophy’.  Prior to his 
relationship  with Mill, Ricardo was exposed to Belsham’s 
philosophical ideas. Among these were arguments for a 
limited scepticism, according to which knowledge of 
essences and causal connections is impossible, with the 
implication  that law-like explanations were to be preferred to  
causal explanations.  In addition, Ricardo opted  for 
simplification at the price of the lesser realism of hypotheses, 
and stressed the need for the explicit definition of terms. His 
ethical theory was a blend of intuitionist and consequentialist 
elements, matching psychological eudemonism with 
universal benevolence, and assuming the greatest happiness 
to be the goal for action.  On the other hand, after reading 
Mill’s History of British India, Ricardo raised objections  to 
the idea of utility as a mark of rational action and to the 
possibility of measuring and comparing the utility of different 
goals for action ( Works, vol. 7, p.242). Also his quest for an 
invariable measure of value (vol. 1, p.429; vol. 7, p.185) 
reflects misgivings about the Benthamite doctrine of utility.  
Ricardo refers twice in his correspondence to the 
principle of utility.  In a letter to Francis Place in defence of 
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Malthus’s use of the words “right” and “law of nature”, he 
argued that these amounted roughly to “utility” or “the good 
of the whole”, and added: “I as well as you am a disciple of 
the Bentham and Mill school” (Works, vol. 9, p.52).  When 
writing  to Maria Edgeworth, he declared that he would have 
supported any policy encouraging cultivation of potatoes if 
he were convinced that this would be a remedy to famines, 
concluding that he would fight “till death in favor of the 
potatoe, for my motto, after Mr. Bentham, is ‘the greatest 
happiness to the greatest number”’(ibid., pp.238-9). Yet, it is 
as well to  reflect that in the former case  Ricardo was 
arguing that differences in theory between Benthamite 
Utilitarianism and Malthusian natural law was irrelevant in 
practice, and in the latter  his intention was to poke fun at 
Bentham and Mill. 
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